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CRIMINAL LAW -WARTIME SUSPENSION OF
LIMITATIONS ACT EXTENDS FILING TIME FOR
FRAUD CLAIMS AGAINST BIG DIG
CONTRACTORS - UNITED STATES V. PROSPERI,

573 F. SUPP. 2D 436 (D. MASS. 2008)
The United States government historically suspends federal statutes
of limitations during wartime.' The Wartime Suspension Act ("Suspension
Act") extends the statute of limitations involving crimes of fraud against
the federal government for five years after the end of a war.2 In United
States v. Prosperi,3 the Federal District Court of Massachusetts considered
whether the country was "at war" and, if so, whether the Suspension Act
allowed fraud claims to be brought against Central Artery Tunnel project
("Big Dig") contractors that were otherwise time-barred. 4 The court
concluded that the United States was at war in both Afghanistan and Iraq
when the lawsuit originated, and thus, the fraud claims were not timebarred because the Suspension Act applied.5
The Big Dig, a fifteen-year $14.6 billion infrastructure project,
included replacing almost eight miles of highway and moving large
portions of an elevated highway underground in Boston, Massachusetts. 6

1

See infra note 17 (highlighting history of suspension of statutes of limitations during
wartime).
2 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3287 (West 2008) (detailing extension of statute of limitations during
wartime). The statute reads in part,

When the United States is at war or Congress has enacted a specific authorization for
the use of the Armed Forces, as described in section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution

(50 U.S.C. § 1544(b)), the running of any statute of limitations applicable to any
offense (1) involving fraud or attempted fraud against the United States or any agency
thereof in any manner, whether by conspiracy or not, . . . shall be suspended until 5
years after the termination of hostilities as proclaimed by a Presidential proclamation,
with notice to Congress, or by a concurrent resolution of Congress. For purposes of
applying such definitions in this section, the term "war" includes a specific
authorization for the use of the Armed Forces, as described in section 5(b) of the War
Powers Resolution (50 U.S.C. § 1544(b)).
Id.

3 573 F. Supp. 2d 436 (D. Mass. 2008).
4 See id. at 438-39 (explaining alleged crime).

5 See id. at 455 (holding statute of limitations tolled from September 18, 2001 to May 1,
2006).
6 See THOMAS P. HUGHES, RESCUING PROMETHEUS: FOUR MONUMENTAL PROJECTS THAT
CHANGED THE MODERN WORLD 12 (Pantheon Books 1998) (chronicling history of Big Dig).
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The defendants, former managers of Aggregate Industries, a Big Dig
contractor, were charged with making and mailing false claims to the
federal government. 7 The government alleged that beginning in 1999, the
defendants supplied concrete that did not meet government construction
contract specifications. 8 The government indicted the defendants on May
3, 2006. 9 The defendants moved to dismiss the majority of the counts as
time-barred on June 29, 2007.0
Historically, the branches of the federal government struggle over
which branch has the ability to decide that the country is at war." The
Constitution gives Congress the power to "declare war" and the President
the power to command the military.1 2 The Constitution, however, is silent
The project first received federal funding in 1987 after Congress overrode President Reagan's
veto of the transportation bill. Id.
7 See Prosperi,573 F. Supp. 2d at 438-39 (detailing charges). The defendants were
charged
under 18 U.S.C. § 1020 and 18 U.S.C. § 1341 for making false claims and mail fraud. Id. at 439
n.l.Under 18 U.S.C. § 1020, it is illegal for a government contractor to make a "false statement,
false representation, false report, or false claim with respect to the character, quality, quantity, or
cost of any work performed ... or materials furnished or to be furnished, in connection with the
construction of any highway or related project approved by the Secretary of Transportation." 18
U.S.C. § 1020 (2006). The mail fraud statute punishes individuals who intend to defiaud the
government and use the United States Postal Service to do so. See 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2007).
8 See Raja Mishra and Shelley Murphy, Big Dig Probe Expanding, BOSTON GLOBE, May 5,
2006, available at http://www.boston.com/news/local//articles/2006/05/05/bigdigprobe_ expan
ding/. The defendants were charged with taking old concrete, mixing it with water, and then
falsifying documents to make the concrete appear new and up to contract specifications. Id. The
specifications require the concrete to be used within 90 minutes of being mixed or it will begin to
harden. Id. If water is added or the concrete is used after that time it may not solidify properly.
Id. The defendants were accused of using inadequate concrete in approximately 5000 of the
500,000 loads it delivered and used in the Big Dig project. See Prosperi, 573 F. Supp. 2d at 439.
9 Prosperi,573 F. Supp. 2d at 439 (explaining procedural history).
10 Id. (explaining procedural history).
11 See J. Brian Atwood, The War Powers Resolution in the Age of Terrorism, 52 ST. LOUIS
U. L. J. 57, 74 (2007) (commenting on constitutional separation of powers). The Framers drafted
the Constitution to create a check and balance system when waging war. Id. at 69. They did not
"wish to leave the security of our nation and the world to the exclusive judgment of a single
person whose accountability is limited in the short term." Id. at 74. In 1973, "congressional
frustration over an unpopular war" prompted the ratification of The War Powers Resolution Act.
Id. at 58. The Act attempted to reign in the President's war power by requiring the President to
"consult with Congress before introducing United States Armed Forces into hostilities ...." 50
U.S.C. § 1542 (1973).
12 U.S. CONST. art. I (setting forth legislative powers). The War Power is a shared power
between the Legislative and Executive Branches. See Robert Gray Bracknell, Real Facts,
"Magic Language, " the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, and ConstitutionalAuthority to Commit
Forces to War, 13 NEW ENG. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 167, 213-14 (2007). Specifically, Congress
has the power "to announce the commencement or to announce the recognition of the existence
of a state war" through a formal declaration or legislation. Id. at 224. It is not necessary for
Congress to use the phrase "at war" if the country has taken "war-like" actions. Id. The
President is the "Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States," and has the
power to sign treaties with the consent of two thirds of the Senate. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2
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as to the war power of the Judiciary.' 3 In light of this silence, the Judiciary
has been reluctant to rule that a war legally exists.' 4 Instead, the Supreme
Court, through analyzing the actions of both the President and Congress,
can articulate the start and end dates of wars.' 5 Traditionally, the Court
looks towards presidential proclamations, formal peace agreements, and
specific legislation to determine when a war has ended.16
Despite the ambiguity as to which branch of the federal
government decides if the country is "at war," the government has long
recognized the need to extend statutes of limitations during times of war.17
(providing scope of Presidential powers). In addition, the Commander in Chief has a "textually
undefined 'executive' power," Bracknell, supra at 212, limited by The War Powers Resolution
Act of 1973. See Atwood, supra note 11,at 58.
13 See John M. Hagan, Note. From the XYZ Affair to the War on Terror: The Justiciabilitv of
Time o f War, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1327, 1333-34 (2004) (commenting on absence of war
language regarding the judiciary). The only time "war" is mentioned within Article Ill is to
define the crime of treason as "levying war" against the United States. U.S. CONST. art. Il, § 3.
14 See Hagan, supra note 13, at 1338 (discussing Judiciary's war power). The Supreme
Court has refused to decide whether a state of war exists because it is a political question. See
Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160, 170 (1948) ("[the existence of wars] are matters of political
judgment for which judges have neither technical competence nor official responsibility."); see
also Stephen 1.Vladeck, Ludecke s Lengthening Shadow: The Disturbing Prospect of War
W1ithout End, 2 J.NAT'L SECURITY L. & POL'Y 53, 62-63 (2006) (discussing whether existence of
war is a political question). The Court has also refused to decide whether an officially declared
war is in fact legally terminated. See Ludecke, 335 U.S. at 169 ("[T]hat a war though merely
formally kept alive had in fact ended, is a question too fraught with gravity even to be adequately
formulatcd when not compelled."). Instead, through a line of cases dating back to the Civil War,
"the judicial branch retains the power to determine the condition of war in a material sense."
Hagan, siqwa note 13, at 1339; see also Vladeck, supra (citing The Amy Warwick, 67 U.S. 635,
670 (1862)) (highlighting courts can decide "disputes turning on when a state of war existed.").
15 See Ludecke, 335 U.S. at 168 ("'The state of war' may be terminated by treaty or
legislation or Presidential proclamation."); United States v. Anderson, 76 U.S. 56, 70 (1869)
(requiring proclamation by President or act of Congress "that armed resistance had ceased."). See
also John Alan Cohan, Legal War: When Does it Exist, and When Does it End?, 27 HASTINGS
INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 221, 301 (2004) ("[T]he end of a war is something determined by the
political branches of the government ...."). Despite the fact that the Court looks toward the
actions of Congress and the President to signal the legal end to war, the Constitution is silent as to
who has the power to declare that war has ended. See Hagan, supranote 13, at 1368.
16 See Ludecke, 335 U.S. at 170 (finding country still at war because political branch had not
ended war); Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries & Warehouse Co., 251 U.S. 146, 163 (1919)
(holding war act applicable because of Congressional and Presidential acts). In 1919, the Court
ruled that the country was still at war because the President controlled the railroad, the wheat and
grain supplies, and there were still armed forces in occupied territory. Hamilton, 251 U.S. at 163.
See also Cohan, supra note 15, at 312 ("[W]ar does not end with the cessation of hostilities in and
of itself ...a formal proclamation or peace treaty is necessary to establish that a war has in fact
come to an end in the legal sense.").
1" See Lindsey Powell, Unraveling Criminal Statutes o Limitations, 45 AM. CRtM. L. REV.
115, 122-23 (2008) (explaining history of suspending federal statutes of limitations during
wartime). The first suspension of federal statutes of limitations occurred in 1869 after the Civil
War. Id. at 122. This extended the statutes of limitations for offenses committed in states that
had seceded until two years after the state regained representation in Congress. Id. If statutes of
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The Suspension Act, first enacted in 1921, extends the statute of limitations
for crimes involving fraud or attempted fraud against the government
during times of war. 18 The statute applies when fraud is an essential
element of the crime charged and the offense involves a pecuniary matter.1 9
Congress amended the Suspension Act multiple times; first in 1948, when
the words "at war" were added to make the statute permanent. 20 The
statute was amended again in July 2008 to expand the definition of "at war"
to include the congressional authorization of military force and to
encourage the prosecution of crimes involving fraud against the
government, despite the statute not being successfully used since 1956.2!

limitations were not suspended, the government was faced with the problem that violators would
not be prosecuted. Id. However, the "policy behind any statute of limitations ... is as valid
during war as in peacetime." Willard P. Norberg, The Wartime Suspension Limitations Act, 3
STAN. L. REV. 440, 452 (1951). Statutes of limitations, in general, serve the general purpose of
limiting the prejudice to a defendant litigating a stale claim, which may affect his ability to gather
evidence or witnesses. Id.
is See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3287 (West 2008) (noting legislative intent); Bridges v. United States,
346 U.S. 209, 217 (1953) (detailing legislative history). Fearing that there were "exceptional
opportunities to defraud the United States that were inherent in its gigantic and hastily organized
procurement program," Congress enacted the Suspension Act to safeguard against crimes of fraud
"by increasing the time allowed for their discovery and prosecution." Bridges, 346 U.S. at 218.
',) See Bridges, 346 U.S. at 222 (holding false statement at hearing did not toll Suspension
Act because pecuniary interest not involved); see also Norberg, supra note 17, at 440 (explaining
use of statute post World War II). During the McCarthy Era, the government unsuccessfully
attempted to use the Suspension Act to prosecute suspected communists. See id
20 See Bridges, 346 U.S. at 217 (detailing legislative history). The legislative history of the
text explains that prior to 1948, the text of the statute would refer to a specific war and the
legislation would expire after that war ended. Id. at 218-29. For example, the Suspension Act
was first enacted in 1921 during World War I, lapsed, and was reenacted again in 1942 to extend
the statutes of limitation for the same types of fraudulent crimes against the federal government
during World War 11. See id
21 See United States v. Temple, 147 F. Supp. 118, 121 (N.D. Ill. 1956) (allowing fraud claim
under Suspension Act). The statute was frequently used during the 1950s to prosecute crimes
involving fraud that occurred during World War 11. See United States v. Grainger, 346 U.S. 235,
243 (1953) (holding Suspension Act applied to fraudulent purchases of wool); United States v.
Taylor, 132 F. Supp. 886, 889 (E.D.N.Y. 1955) (denying motion to dismiss claims of fraud
against National Guard officer due to Suspension Act). Despite the lengthy conflicts in Korea
and Vietnam, the statute was not used again until almost forty years later. See United States v.
Shelton, 816 F. Supp. 1132, 1134-35 (W.D. Tex. 1993). In Shelton, the court found that the
Persian Gulf Conflict was not a "war" for the purposes of the Suspension Act. Id. at 1135.
Specifically, the court reasoned that the "Congressional intent underlying the Suspension Act
appears to have been more directly concerned with such massive and pervasive conflicts as World
War 11." Id. The court supported this argument by reasoning that "[T]he Vietnam War was
arguably a much more intrusive and lengthy conflict than the recent conflict in the Persian Gulf
area, but the Suspension Act does not appear to have ever been used..." during that war. Id.; see
also S. Rep. No. 110-431 (July 25, 2008) (amending statute). Congress amended the statute with
the express purpose to promote prosecution during times when Congress authorized the use of
military force. Id. The amendment also changes the tolling period from three years to five years
after the end of hostilities. Id.
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The definition of "at war" within legislation has been the subject of
much debate.2 2 "[T]here is next to no positive law regulating the warending process which is both substantive and explicit;" thus, the specific

actions necessary to end a war are unclear.2 3

Traditionally, war ends

through a formal agreement or complete military victory by annihilation of
the adversary.24 With the advent of wars against terrorism, like those in
Afghanistan and Iraq, the analysis becomes complicated because there is

not an easily identifiable enemy, such as a country.2 5 As a result, it is
difficult to ascertain the start and end dates of untraditional wars like those
in Afghanistan and Iraq.26
22 See Cohan, supra note 15, at 223 ("American courts seem never to have agreed on a

standard for determining the existence of a state of war."); Vladeck, supra note 14, at 62
("Questions about when and how wars end have come before U.S. courts in nearly every major
American conflict.").
23 Brian Orend, Terminating Wars and Establishing Global Governance, 12 CAN. J. L. &
JURIS. 253, 254 (1999). This is a problem on a global and national scale as both the United States
Constitution and international law contain little guidance for terminating wars. See id.at 255;
Cohan, supra note 15, at 301 ("Although the Constitution provides that Congress has the power
to declare war, there is no provision regarding which branch has the power to terminate war.").
See also Vladeck, supra note 14, at 55 (explaining cessation of war). "[I]t
is irrelevant whether
fighting actually has ceased. All that matters is whether the political branches have formally
acknowledged as much." Id.;Hagan, supra note 13, at 1371 (arguing courts may not have
"sufficient standards" to determine end of war).
24 See W. Michael Reisman, Stopping Wars and Making Peace: Reflections on the Ideology
and Practiceof Conflict Termination in Contemporary World Politics, 6 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP.
L. 5, 36-39 (1998) (outlining methods of ending war). Military victory involves everything from
"political obliteration to complete subjection of the adversary." Id. at 36. See also Wolff
Heintschel von Heinegg, Factors in War to Peace Transitions, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 843,
849-52 (2004) (detailing ways to end war). A war is not terminated until there is the end of
"active hostilities" or a formal peace agreement, both of which must be accompanied by the end
of occupation by the hostile army. Id. at 845, 852. The end of "active hostilities" also must
include the release of political prisoners. Id. at 854.
25 See Vladeck, supra note 14, at 94. The Supreme Court "seems to recognize that now, and
for the indefinite future, we are indeed, at war." Id. (discussing courts decision in Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004)). For example, the President, in asking for authorization to
invade Afghanistan proclaimed, "Our war on terror begins with Al Qaida, but it does not end
there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped, and
defeated." Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the United States Response to the
Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1140, 1141 (Sept. 20, 2001 ).
26 See Hagan, supra note 13, at 1333 ("[T]he War on Terror does not lend itself to easy
labeling of enemies, battles, and start and end dates."). On September 18, 2001, Congress
authorized the President "to take action to deter and prevent actions of international terrorism
against the United States." Authorization for the Use of Military Force Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115
Stat. 224 (2001). With this authorization, the United States began "Operation Enduring
Freedom" to root out Al Qaida terror training camps in Afghanistan. See Michael Petrusic,
Comment, Enemy Combatants in the War on Terror and the Implications .for the U.S. Armed
Forces, 85 N.C. L. REV. 636, 640 (2007). As of June 1, 2008, 48,250 troops were stationed in
Afghanistan.
See JOANNE O'BRYANT & MICHAEL WATERHOUSE, U.S. FORCES IN
AFGHANISTAN, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, (May 8, 2008), www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RS226
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In United States v. Prosperi, the Federal District Court of
Massachusetts held that the United States was at war with both Afghanistan
and Iraq, and therefore, the Suspension Act extended the statute of
limitations for crimes involving fraud committed against the government
during the war period.2 7 Despite possible political implications, the court
reasoned that it was appropriate to determine whether the country was, in
fact, at war. 28 The court debated the actual meaning of the words "at war"
within the statute. 29 Acknowledging that the statute was used rarely
between World War II and today, the court rejected the idea that the statute
had been impliedly revoked.3 ° Instead, the court identified four factors that
a court should consider in determining whether the United States is at
war. 3 1 Specifically, the court considered whether: 1) Congress gave
authorization to the President; 2) the conflict is deemed a war under
international law; 3) the size and scope of the conflict is large; and 4) the
32
conflict causes a diversion of national resources.
Applying the first factor, the Prosperi court found that Congress
and the Supreme Court had sufficiently recognized the President's
authority to combat terrorism in both Afghanistan and Iraq.33 Because a
33.pdf. On October 16, 2002, Congress authorized the use of military force in Iraq.
Authorization for the Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (October 16,
2002). The attack on Iraq began with 40 cruise missile strikes against Iraq on March 19, 2003.
See GlobalSecurity.org, Operation Iraqi Freedom, www.globalsecurity.org/ military/ops/iraqi _fre
edom.htm (last visited Jan. 18, 2009). Although the end of major combat operations in Iraq was
declared on May 1, 2003, there have been 298 operations since that time. See id.
27 See United States v. Propseri, 573 F. Supp. 2d 436, 439 (D. Mass. 2008) (setting forth
holding). The court explained, "it is clear from both the text and the legislative history that the at
war provision of the Suspension Act was intended to capture any authorized military engagement
that might compromise or impede the government's ability to investigate allegations of fraud."
1d. at 449.
2K See id. at 442-43 (supporting justiciability of war). The court explained that although
some political questions are excluded from judicial review, the determination that the country is
at war is an allowable exercise. Id. at 442. The Suspension Act itself has been reviewed by many
courts. Id. at 441-42.
29 See id. at 443 (questioning definition of"at war" within statute). The court recognized that
the Suspension Act is unusual because it requires not only that the nation be "at war," but also
that the government suffers a pecuniary harm. Id. at 441. Although the statutory language may
appear clear on its face, the court anticipated difficulty in interpreting these words because "the
Nation may be 'at war' for one purpose, and 'at peace' for another." Id. at 444 (internal citations
omitted).
30 See id. at 445 (noting statute's scant usage since World War II). The court highlighted that
the statute "has not been the subject of extensive judicial review .
Id. at 444. The court
I..."
explained that whether or not the Suspension Act applies is a prudential decision reflecting
political ideology or mere governmental expediency. Id. at 445.
31 See id. at 449 (outlining war test). The court created this test by looking at legislative
history, case law. custom, and common sense. Id.
32 See Propseri,573 F. Supp. 2d at 449 (outlining factors).
33 See id. at 450 (analyzing first factor). The Court explained that on September 18, 2001,
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formal declaration of war was not necessary, the court also found that the
conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq could be deemed wars under international
law.3 4 Considering the third factor, the court concluded that the size and
scope suggested that both military actions were, in fact, "wars."35 Finally,

applying the last factor, the court recognized that the terrorist attacks on
September 11, 2001, prompted a massive reorganization of the federal
36
government that diverted resources to preventing international terrorism.
With all four factors satisfied, the court ultimately concluded that the

conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq were "wars" for the purpose of the statute,
and that the Afghanistan War ended on December 22, 2001, and the Iraq
War ended on May 1, 2003. 37
The Federal District Court of Massachusetts correctly found that
the meaning of "at war" within the Suspension Act was a judicial, rather

Congress passed the Authorization of the Use of Military Force to allow the President to use
military force against those individuals responsible for the September 11,2001 terrorist attacks.
Id. A month after the attack, on October 11, 2001, Congress authorized the use of military force
against Iraq. Id. In addition, the judicial branch has "consistently invoked the legal presumption
that the United States is at war" by, for example, calling those individuals detained in the
conflicts enemy combatants. Id.
34 See id. at 451 (explaining second factor). The court detailed the definition of "war" from
the seventeenth century. Id. Conceding that seventeenth century and eighteenth century
international law required a formal declaration of war, the court concluded that "it is almost
impossible to find a more contemporary definition of 'lawful' war that depends on a formal
declaration for its existence." Id.
35 See id. at 452 (analyzing third factor). The court noted that both conflicts cost more than
any other war, with the exception of World War II, and both conflicts have lasted longer than
World War I and World War II added together. Id. The Afghanistan and Iraq wars have cost
$859 billion in the past seven fiscal years. Id. "The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has
projected a total combined cost through FY2017 of between $1.2 trillion and $1.7 trillion." Id.
The court also considered the fact that over one million soldiers have been deployed in both wars
and 4,589 have died to that point. Id.
36 See id. at 453 (examining fourth factor). The court discussed the profound change the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, had on the federal government. Id. Specifically, in
response to these attacks Congress passed the Patriot Act, amended the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act, and created the Department of Homeland Security. Id. In addition, the
prevention of terrorism, rather than the investigation of ordinary crimes, became the top priority
of the Justice Department. Id. As a result, there have been sharp decreases in prosecutions of
both white collar and organized crime. Id. at 454.
37 See Prosperi, 573 F. Supp. 2d at 455 (expounding nation was "at war" and wars have
ended). It was important for the court to set an end date for each war because "[tlhe tolling
provisions of the Suspension Act apply 'until three years after the termination of hostilities . ..."
Id. at 454. The court rejected the government's argument that both wars were ongoing, choosing
instead to announce a clear ending date for both. Id. The court chose December 22, 2001, the
day the United States recognized the new Afghani government, as the end date for the
Afghanistan War. Id. It chose May 1, 2003, the day President Bush declared "Mission
Accomplished" aboard the USS Abraham Lincoln, as the termination of hostilities in the Iraq
War. Id.
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than a political, question.
The court, in line with Supreme Court
precedent, looked toward congressional and presidential actions to
determine the start dates of each war. 9
Additionally, the court
appropriately rejected the reasoning that the Suspension Act had been
impliedly repealed due to disuse. 40 The court went beyond Supreme Court
precedent, however, in formulating the four-factor test to determine
whether the country was at war.4 1 While the court was correct in
considering congressional recognition of the Afghanistan and Iraq Wars, it
should not have analyzed the wars under international law or considered
the size or cost of either war.42 Instead, the court should have only
analyzed the actions of Congress and the President and decided whether
43
either political branch had acknowledged a start or end date to either war.
The court incorrectly defined December 22, 2001 as the end date of
the Afghanistan War.44 Although cited, the court ignored Handi v.
Rumsfeld, 45 in which the Supreme Court found that the United States was
still "at war" in Afghanistan in 2004.46 Specifically, the Supreme Court

I

See sources cited supra note 14 and accompanying text (explaining limits to Judiciary's
ability to rule on war).
39 See cases cited supra note 15 and accompanying text (laying out Supreme Court
precedent). Specifically, the court cited the two times Congress authorized the use of military
force with regards to Afghanistan and Iraq. Prosperi, 573 F. Supp. 2d at 450; see also sources
cited supra note 26 and accompanying text (summarizing Afghanistan and Iraq Wars).
40 See Prosperi,573 F. Supp. 2d at 445. The court's reasoning is supported by the fact that
the Suspension Act was amended in 2008 expressly to promote prosecutions. See S.Rep. No.
110-431 (July 25, 2008) (outlining legislative intent).
41 See sources cited supra note 14 and accompanying text (explaining judicial limitations
with regard to existence of war). The Supreme Court refuses to "recognize war in a legal sense."
Hagan, sipra note 13, at 1338. Additionally, it is questionable "whether courts possess sufficient
standards to decide the issue of time of war .... ." Id. at 1371. Instead, Supreme Court precedent
suggests that federal courts can decide wartime cases when the nation is obviously at war and the
facts have relatively limited foreign implication. See id. at 1377.
42 See cases cited supra note 15 and accompanying text (detailing Supreme Court precedent).
See also Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160, 169 (1948) (discussing war tennination). To declare
a war had started, the Supreme Court looked neither to international definitions of the state of
war, nor to the size and scope of the conflict; instead, the Court looked solely to the actions of the
political branch for each major United States conflict since the Civil War. See sources cited
supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text (detailing Supreme Court precedent).
43 See sources cited supra note 14 and accompanying text (outlining judicial limits in regard
to war); see also cases cited supra note 15 and accompanying text (detailing Supreme Court
precedent in regard to existence of war).
44 See United States v. Prosperi, 573 F. Supp. 2d 436, 455 (D. Mass. 2008) (tolling
limitations period for Afghanistan war from September 18, 2001, until December 22, 2004). The
court specifically found that the Afghanistan War ended December 22, 2001, when the United
States recognized full diplomatic recognition of an interim Afghan government. Id.
45 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
46 See id. at 521 ("Active combat operations against Taliban fighters apparently are ongoing
in Afghanistan.").
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explained that the United States could only hold enemy combatants as long
as the conflict was ongoing.47 The Supreme Court's holding in Hamdi

necessitates a finding that the country is still at war in Afghanistan because
there were still Afghan enemy combatants detained. 48 Additionally, the
court should have considered the fact that American soldiers still occupy
Afghanistan and still engage in active military operations.49
The court also erred in defining May 1, 2003, the day President
Bush declared major combat operations over, as the end date of the Iraq

War. 50

Although the court was correct in looking toward presidential

actions, the court failed to apply Supreme Court precedent looking at both
the words and actions of the political branches to determine the end of
war. 5' Since May 1, 2003, the United States has engaged in 298 military
operations in Iraq.52 The court should have noted the absence of specific
53
peace agreements or formal legislation indicating that the war was over.
Without a formal peace agreement or the withdrawal of troops from Iraq, it

was incorrect for the Prosperi court to break with precedent and declare
that the war had ended. 54
In United States v. Prosperi, the Federal District Court of

47 Id.at 518. The Court explained that detention of enemy combatants "for the duration of
the particular conflict in which they were captured, is so fundamental and accepted an incident to
war as to be an exercise of the 'necessary and appropriate force' Congress has authorized the
President to use." Id.
48 See id. at 521 ("If the record establishes that United States troops are still involved in
active combat in Afghanistan, those detentions are part of the exercise of the 'necessary and
appropriate force,' and therefore are authorized ....
").
49 See Heintschel von Heinegg, supra note 24, at 854 (explaining cessation of hostilities and
release of prisoners necessary for war to end); see also O'Bryant, supranote 26 (noting American
troop levels in Afghanistan).
50 See United States v. Prosperi, 573 F. Supp. 2d 436, 455 (D. Mass. 2008) (defining end of
the Iraq War).
51 See sources cited supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text (discussing actions of political
branches determine when a war has ended); see also Hamilton v. Ky. Distilleries & Warehouse
Co., 251 U.S. 146, 159-60 (1919) (examining actions of President and Congress to determine
state of war). In Hamilton, the Supreme Court considered whether World War I had ended for the
purposes of a statute. Id.at 153. To make this determination, the Court looked at both the words
and actions of the President and Congress. Id. Although the President had made declarations that
the war was over, the fact that Congress passed wartime legislation, and that the President still
controlled the railroad, wheat and grain supply, and kept an army in occupied territory, led the
Court to find that the country was still "at war." Id. at 160, 163. Similarly, Congress amended
the Suspension Act in 2008, five years after major combat operations had been declared over. S.
Rep. No. 110-431 (July 25, 2008). This Amendment extended the tolling period from three to
five years and explicitly included conflicts for which Congress had authorized military force, like
Afghanistan and Iraq. See id.
52 See Operation Iraqi Freedom, supra note 26 (listing combat operations after 2003 in Iraq).
53 See supra note 24 and accompanying text (discussing traditional ends to wars).
54 See supra note 24 and accompanying text (discussing how wars traditionally end).
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Massachusetts considered whether the United States was "at war" for the
purpose of prosecution under the Suspension Act. The court held that the
nation had been at war with Afghanistan and Iraq, and therefore the tolling
provision of the Suspension Act allowed fraud charges to be brought
against Big Dig contractors. Ignoring Supreme Court precedent, the court
incorrectly applied a four-part test to determine whether the Afghanistan
and Iraq wars were ongoing. Additionally, the court arbitrarily found that
both the Afghanistan and Iraq wars had ended, without appropriately
considering the actions of the political branches as required by the Supreme
Court. The court's actions not only ignores Supreme Court precedent, but
also threatens the separation of powers.
CailinM. Campbell

